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We construct a simple equilibrium search model in which workers accumulate information 
about previously met employment contacts. We term the latter search capital. Here search 
capital (partially) insures workers against adverse shocks. The model provides a theory of 
job-to-job transitions that are associated with voluntary or involuntary mobility and with wage 
rises or wage cuts. It also shows why low wage and younger workers are associated with a 
higher probability of becoming unemployed. 
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 1 Introduction
Models of on-the-job search provide a useful framework for analysing job and wage mo-
bility as well as wage dispersion. (See Burdett and Mortensen, 1998, and Postel-Vinay
and Robin, 2002, for leading examples.) In these models, workers move up the earnings
distribution as they repeatedly search and nd better employment. When displaced, how-
ever, these workers do not recall the information from employment contacts accumulated
during this process.
Amnesia is unappealing. Information recalled from prior contacts is potentially a
valuable asset for avoiding unemployment when a worker separates from the current job.
Recent empirical work in the networks literature points out the importance that em-
ployment contacts have in signicantly increasing the job nding rates of non-employed
workers (see Capellari and Tatsiramos, 2011, and references therein).
This paper formalises these ideas in a simple equilibrium model in which past search
experiences become capital that (partially) insures workers against adverse shocks. Here
on-the-job search not only enables workers to increase their wage, but to also build em-
ployment contacts. If displaced, workers can use previous employment contacts to fall
back on. This simple and intuitive mechanism provides a plausible structural interpreta-
tion for the exogenous reallocation shock process added to estimated job search models.
Without this type of ad hoc addition, on-the-job search models fail to account for the
high proportion of job-to-job transitions that involve a wage cut or for the prevalence of
immediate job re-accessions found in many OECD countries (see Jolivet, Postel-Vinay
and Robin, 2006). Remembering contact histories directly builds in this feature. More-
over, with recall possible, the high turnover rates of young and low paid workers might
not be due solely to the instability of their jobs, but to the relatively small size of their
employment network as well.
2 Economic Environment
The model is based on the framework developed by Postel-Vinay and Robin (2002) and
Carrillo-Tudela, Menzio and Smith (2011). Time is continuous and goes on forever. There
is a unit mass of risk neutral workers and rms with a common discount rate r > 0.
Workers maximize the discounted expected sum of their lifetime consumption. Firms
operate using a constant return to scale technology and maximize the discounted expected
sum of their prots.
Employment status along with the amount of capital accumulated from prior search
characterise a worker. During unemployment, this worker consumes z > 0 units of output.
While employed at wage w, the worker produces x > z and consumes w. The worker's
search capital, n, represents the number of available prior employment contacts, excluding
the current employer or any rm that the worker might have just met. To keep the analysis
2as straightforward as possible, let n = 0;1. Further, a worker loses a contact at Poisson
rate of   0 which can be interpreted as the rate at which search capital depreciates.
Unemployed workers meet a rm at rate   0. Employed workers meet a rm at rate
s; where s  0 denotes the worker's search intensity. Any meeting triggers o a complete
information auction for the worker's services among the just met rm and, if available,
from the worker's other contact or employer. Each rm bids a wage knowing whether
or not a competitor exists. If the worker accepts a bid, the wage remains constant until
either the match separates or until another meeting which would trigger a new auction.
If all bids are rejected, the worker becomes unemployed.
We emphasize that this fallback into unemployment assumption is made only to ease
the notational burden. Allowing an employed worker who meets another rm thereby
triggering a new auction with two bidders to reject both bids and then revert to the
previous wage does not alter the equilibrium outcome. The possibility of reverting to
the old wage expands the strategies for rms such that these strategies could depend
on the existing wage and employment relationship. However, because a rm in a single
bidder auction oers a wage that makes the worker indierent between unemployment and
employment (U1 = E0(w) below), there is no dierence in the value of reversion between
employment and unemployment.
Regardless of the acceptance decision, a worker with no previous contacts adds the
newly met rm to the contact list.1 If the worker transits from unemployment to em-
ployment, however, the newly met rm becomes the employer and does not count as a
contact in n.
At rate   0, an employed worker is exogenously displaced from the current job.
When this happens, the current employer receives a payo of zero and the worker receives
a take-it-or-leave-it oer from the rm that is still in contact with him (if any). If the
displaced worker accepts the fallback oer, the worker moves from one employer to the
other without an intervening spell of unemployment. If the worker rejects the oer (or if
the worker did not have a contact), the worker becomes unemployed.
3 Equilibrium
We focus on stationary symmetric pure strategies. Let f = (w1;w2) denote the strategy
of a rm, where the rst element denotes the wage the rm oers to a worker in an auction
with one bidder and the second element the wage the rm oers to a worker in an auction
with two bidders. Let Un denote the lifetime utility of a worker who is unemployed and
has n contacts. Let En(w) denote the lifetime utility of a worker who is employed at the
wage w and has n contacts. Let Mn+1 denote the value to the rm of participating in an
1We assume that a worker who does not accept a job oer is not in bad terms with the potential
employer later on.
3auction with n + 1 bidders. Let Cu denote the value to the rm of being in contact with
an unemployed worker who has no other contact. Similarly, let Ce denote the value to
the rm of being in contact with an employed worker who has no other contact. Finally,
let Jn(w) denote the value to a rm from employing a worker who has n contacts at wage
w.
The expected value of an unemployed worker satises
rUn = z + [maxfEn(wn+1);U1g   Un] + n[U0   U1]:
Given that an employed worker stops searching after obtaining a contact (the capital
gains from doing so are zero), the expected value of employment at wage w satises
rE0(w) = w + s[maxfE1(w2);U1)g   E0(w)] + [U0   E0(w)];
rE1(w) = w + [maxfE0(w1);U1g   E1(w)] + [E0(w)   E1(w)]:
Since En(w) is strictly increasing in w; the worker's acceptance strategy in an auction
with n + 1 bidders has the reservation property. Let w = (R1;R2) denote the strategy
of a worker, where Rn denotes the reservation wage in an auction with n bidders.
The rm's expected value from meeting a worker with no other contacts
M1 = max
w fI[w  R1](J0(w)   C
u)g + C
u;
where I is an indicator function that takes the value of one if w  R1 and zero other-
wise. The rm's expected value from meeting a worker who is either employed or who is




I[w > w2](J1(w)   C







where the rm oers the wage w to the worker and the other contact (or current employer)
oers him the wage w2 and we have conjectured that w2  R2. We also assume that a
worker with two acceptable and equal oers chooses one randomly.
Denition: A Symmetric Equilibrium is a worker's strategy w = (R1;R2) and a rm's
strategy f = (w1;w2) such that:
(i) For n = 0;1; En(w)  U1 if and only if w  Rn+1;
(ii)For n = 0;1; wn solves the rm's maximization problem describe by Mn:
4 Characterisation
The wage oered in a one bidder auction equals the workers reservation wage (w1 = R1)
and the wage oered in a two bidder auction makes the rm indierent about hiring
4the worker (w2 solves J1(w2) = Ce): Hence, the rm's strategies f = (w1;w2) imply
M1 = J0(w1) and M2 = J1(w2) = Ce; where Jn(wn+1); Ce and Cu are given by
rJ0(w1) = x   w1 + s[J1(w2)   J0(w1)]   J0(w1);
rJ1(w2) = x   w2   J1(w2);
rC




u = (M2   C
u)   C
u:
The following result describes the indierence condition faced by rms in an auction with
two bidders.
Lemma 1: Given w2  R2;
w2 =
(r + )(r +  + s)
(r + )(r +  + s) + (r + )
x +
(r + )
(r + )(r +  + s) + (r + )
w1:
An unemployed worker with no contacts gets oered a wage w1 = R1 such that he is
indierent from accepting the job; i.e. E0(w1) = U1.
Lemma 2: Given w2  R2;
w1 = 'w2 + (1   ')z;
where
' =
[(r +  + )   s(r +  + )]
(r +  + )(r +  + ) + (r + ))
< 1:
Note that ' is decreasing with search intensity as unemployed workers are prepared
to accept a lower wage today as an investment for future wage growth (see Postel-Vinay
and Robin, 2002). This eect is tempered, however, by the possibility of accumulating
employment contacts. Given that an unemployed worker has the option to continue
searching and increasing the wage when meeting another contact, a rm must compensate
the worker for giving up this option. The relative importance of these channels then pins
down the sign of ':
Proposition 1: The wages oered in equilibrium satisfy:
w2 = x + (1   )z and w1 = x + (1   )z;
where
 =
(r + )(r +  + s)
(r + )(r +  + s) + (1   ')(r + )
;
 = ' and w2 > w1:
To complete the characterisation of equilibrium we need to derive workers' reservation
wages w = fR1;R2g: The above arguments show that w1 = R1: The reservation wage of
workers in a two bidder auction are derived by solving E1(R2) = U1: It is straightforward
5to verify that w2  R2 is indeed satised.2 Further, J0(w1) > Cu > 0 implies rms strictly
prefer to hire an unemployed worker at the rst meeting rather than keeping the worker as
a contact. In a competitive auction, J1(w2) = Ce > 0 implies rms are indierent between
hiring the worker and keeping the worker as an employed contact and hence there is no
protable deviation. These arguments establish existence. Uniqueness can be established
by showing that there is no equilibrium where rms oer a wage wn+1 < Rn+1.
Theorem 1: The reservation strategies w = (R1;R2) and the oer strategies f =
(w1;w2) describe the unique symmetric equilibrium with on-the-job search.
5 Implications
This simple model is consistent with two observed properties of wage and employment
dynamics that traditional search model have a dicult time in explaining. In particular,
the model generates voluntary job-to-job transitions that are associated with wage rises
and involuntary job-to-job transitions that are associated with wage cuts, both prominent
features of modern labour markets (see Jolivet, Postel-Vinay and Robin, 2006). If an
employed worker meets another rm, he chooses an employer with equal probability and
keeps the other rm as an additional contact (a voluntary job-to-job transition with a wage
rise). If subsequently his job is destroyed, the worker takes employment with his contact
(if still available) at a lower wage, experiencing an involuntary job-to-job transition with
a wage cut.
The mechanism inducing wage cuts is very dierent from that explored in other pa-
pers (see e.g. Postel-Vinay and Robin, 2002), in which workers accept voluntary wage
cuts when changing to a job in a more productive rm that oers higher wage growth
prospects. Adding rm heterogeneity also generates this type of job-to-job transition.
Connolly and Gottshack (2008) present evidence showing that an important proportion
of job transitions that involve a wage cut do not lead to faster wage growth in sub-
sequent employment as implied by Postel-Vinay and Robin (2002). Indeed, the latter
nd that rm heterogeneity alone cannot generate the amount of wage cuts observed in
the data. Furthermore, the importance of involuntary transitions is stressed by Nagypal
(2005) who report that although job-to-job movements are approximately twice as large as
employment-to-unemployment changes in the US, only a small fraction (less than 5%) of
employed workers are actively searching. Jolivet, Postel-Vinay and Robin (2006) also nd
that involuntary job mobility that lead to immediate re-accessions (reallocation shocks
and layos) are more frequent that voluntary mobility. It is then important to have a
theory of job mobility that is consistent with this evidence.
Given that the amount of search capital is correlated with a worker's wage the model
2This follows as the solutions of w2 and w1 described in Proposition 1 imply that E1(w2) > E0(w1) =
U1 = E1(R2): Since E1 is increasing in w; we get that w2 > R2:
6also implies that low wage workers have a higher probability of experiencing unemploy-
ment that high wage workers. Since worker's search capital is correlated with time spent
in employment, younger workers also have a higher probability of becoming unemployed.
These two implications are again consistent with empirical evidence. In particular, Stew-
art (2007) nds strong evidence showing that low wage jobs signicantly increase the
worker's probability of experiencing unemployment. This evidence is normally attributed
to \unstable" jobs that exhibit a high separation rate. We argue that the accumulation
of contacts over time and the possibility of recall is a plausible competing as well as
complementary explanation.
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